

Section 54 — Phased Staffing Plan

Phase	Period	Staff to be Recruited	Indicative Annual Cost (TZS M)
1 — Foundation	Year 1	Executive Director; Head of Finance & Admin; Head of Programs & Technical; Head of Legal & Compliance; 3 Zonal Coordinators (Phase 1 zones); 6 Field Officers (2 per zone)	~450,000,000
2 — Expansion	Year 2	Head of Marketing & Supply Chain; Communications & Data Officer; 2 additional Zonal Coordinators (Phase 2 zones); 4 additional Field Officers; 3 Zonal Finance Officers	~650,000,000
3 — Full Capacity	Year 3-5	1 remaining Zonal Coordinator (Phase 3 zone); additional Field Officers (3 per zone minimum); Zonal Finance Officers; Zonal Membership Officers	~950,000,000

The Finance Committee shall prepare a detailed staff budget as part of the Year 1 Operating Budget. Salaries shall be benchmarked against comparable Tanzanian cooperative and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) sector rates. All staff contracts shall comply with the Employment and Labour Relations Act, Cap. 366.

SCHEDULE A: VERSION HISTORY AND CORRECTIONS RECORD**A1 — ORIGINAL CORRECTIONS: v2.0 FINAL (15 corrections from v1.0)**

Ref	Correction Summary	Section(s) Affected
C-1	Zone conflict fixed — Mtwara moved exclusively to Coastal & South Zone	Section 20
C-2	Seed capital plan corrected with realistic funding sources and Year 1 ring-fencing provision	Section 23A
C-3	Critical Minerals bridging clause added pending formal gazettelement	Section 4.2
C-4	Nickel and Manganese environmental and health obligations added	Sections 5 and 32
C-5	9-step disciplinary procedure added — fair hearing process	Section 29A
C-6	Hardship waiver and reduced subscription tier added for low-income members	Section 14A
C-7	Provisional Member mineral sales rights through aggregation centres from Day 1	Section 11A
C-8	ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism framework added for coltan/tantalum	Section 35
C-9	TASCMA Responsible Sourcing Mark administration framework added	Section 38A
C-10	Committee governance rules — quorum, terms, meeting frequency, reporting obligations	Section 18
C-11	GSMT formal partnership for geological research and data sharing added	Section 8
C-12	TMAA data-sharing for levy cross-verification added	Section 25.2
C-13	Responsible Sourcing Mark commercial framework added	Section 38

Ref	Correction Summary	Section(s) Affected
C-14	Transitional provisions added — TSSCMS to TASCMA changeover framework	Part XV
C-15	Full 50-member founding signature sheets added (5 sheets of 10)	Part XVI

A2 — GOVERNANCE AMENDMENTS: v2.1 AMENDMENT SCHEDULE (5 amendments)

Ref	Amendment Summary	Section(s) Affected
A-1	Secretariat structure, organogram, job descriptions, and phased staffing plan added	Part XVII (new)
A-2	Fund Management Committee composition, lending policy, and default recovery procedure added	Sections 24A–24C (new)
A-3	Conflict of Interest framework and Association Contracting Policy added	Sections 16A, 16B (new)
A-4	Coastal & South Zone and Northern & Lake Zone Board seats increased from 1 to 2 each; total Board increased from 15 to 17	Section 21 (amended)
A-5	Presidential Framework — 7-year term, 2-term maximum, cross-zone nomination, PAC, removal process, succession — added	Sections 15A–15G (new)

A3 — CLEAN FINAL CONSOLIDATION: v3.0 (all 20 governance issues resolved)

Fix	Issue Resolved	Section(s) Changed
Fix 1	Legal framework corrected: Cooperative Societies Act No. 6 of 2013; registration authority reverts to TCDC; hybrid commercial subsidiary provision added via Section 3A	Sections 1, 2, 3A (new)
Fix 2	'Associations Tribunal' removed — does not exist in Tanzania law; replaced with CMA, Cooperative Tribunal, and High Court (Commercial Division)	Section 34 Level 5
Fix 3	Section 15A cross-reference corrected to Section 15E.2 (PAC)	Section 15A.2

Fix	Issue Resolved	Section(s) Changed
Fix 4	TSSCMS Establishment Act supersession language corrected — Section 47.2 states Parliament alone can repeal legislation	Section 47.2 (amended)
Fix 5	All correction boxes and version tags removed from operative text; version history consolidated exclusively in this Schedule A	Throughout
Fix 6	ISC financial authority raised from TZS 5,000,000 to TZS 50,000,000 aggregate (max TZS 10,000,000 per commitment)	Sections 1.4, 23A, 49
Fix 7	Board vacancy procedure added — co-option from runner-up; by-election if zone left with zero seats; 18-month rule	Section 21A (new)
Fix 8	FMC Chairperson corrected to elected Finance Committee Representative; Head of Finance serves as non-voting Secretary	Section 24A.2
Fix 9	Finance Committee chicken-and-egg resolved — ISC prepares Year 1 budget; Finance Committee takes over from Year 2	Sections 23A, 49.3
Fix 10	Production threshold breach consequence defined — 90-day remedy period; reclassification or exemption options	Section 10.1 (new)
Fix 11	Periodic fee and threshold review mechanism added — every 2 years against CPI; maximum 15% increase per cycle	Section 14B (new)
Fix 12	Environmental Tiers explicitly mapped to specific production thresholds per mineral for all nine (9) minerals	Section 31
Fix 13	Election petition procedure added — Panel composition, grounds, timelines, two-tier appeal rights	Section 34A (new)
Fix 14	Zonal Assembly and Zonal Committee fully defined — composition, mandate, chairperson selection	Section 22A (new)
Fix 15	President-Board coordination mechanism added — incoming Board briefing; 2/3 majority for strategy change	Section 15E.3 (new)

Fix	Issue Resolved	Section(s) Changed
Fix 16	Section 15.3 General Assembly delegate count corrected to 89	Section 15.3
Fix 17	Revolving Fund surplus policy added — four-level priority waterfall; prohibition on direct cash distributions	Section 24D (new)
Fix 18	'Founding Declaration' terminology standardized throughout	Throughout
Fix 19	AML threshold raised to TZS 10,000,000 aligned with FIU reporting thresholds	Section 39
Fix 20	Associate Member conduct obligations and removal procedure added	Section 9A (new)

A4 — APPENDIX ADDITION: v3.0 with Appendix B

Ref	Addition	Location
App-B	Leadership Structure — Governance Analysis and Sustainability Assessment. Covers: governance architecture overview; presidential term design logic and tensions; Board structure assessment; Board vacancy procedure; Secretariat accountability chain; committee participation sustainability; 12-dimension governance sustainability scorecard (composite 6.7/10); 7 priority governance recommendations for the first Board.	Appendix B (following Schedule A)

END OF SCHEDULE A

Appendix B follows

APPENDIX B

Leadership Structure — Governance Analysis and Sustainability Assessment

Purpose of this Appendix

This Appendix sets out a structured analysis of TASCMA's leadership architecture as embedded in this Constitution. It examines the design logic of each governance tier, identifies structural tensions, assesses sustainability risks, and provides a scored summary against twelve governance dimensions. This analysis forms part of the Association's founding governance record and shall be reviewed by the Board at the end of the first Presidential term.

B.1 Governance Architecture Overview

TASCMA operates through a two-tier structure: an elected governance tier and a professional staff tier. The governance tier is organized into five principal levels, each with distinct mandate, accountability relationship, and term structure.

Governance Level	Body / Role	Mandate	Accountability To
Level 1 — Supreme	General Assembly (all Full Members)	Constitutional authority; election of President and Board; ratification of accounts, budgets, and constitutional amendments	Members themselves
Level 2 — Executive Leadership	President + Vice President (directly elected)	Strategic direction; external representation; chairing of Board and General Assembly; concurrence on Executive Director appointment	General Assembly; Presidential Accountability Committee (PAC)
Level 3 — Governing Board	Board of Directors — 17 elected/appointed members	Policy oversight; financial approval; appointment of Committees and staff; strategic guidance between General Assemblies	General Assembly; President (who chairs)
Level 4 — Operational Governance	Executive Committee (7 members); 7	Day-to-day governance decisions; programme implementation;	Board of Directors; Finance Committee (FMC)

Governance Level	Body / Role	Mandate	Accountability To
	Standing Committees; Fund Management Committee; 6 Zonal Committees	financial monitoring; lending decisions; zonal member services	
Level 5 — Professional Management	Secretariat: Executive Director + 5 Heads of Department + 6 Zonal Coordinators + Field Officers	Operational management; member services; administration; financial management; field delivery; zonal operations	Board of Directors; Executive Committee; President (day-to-day line)

The President chairs the Board ex-officio but is not counted among the 17 Board seats. This preserves the Board's capacity to exercise independent oversight of the President while the President maintains effective leadership of the Board in normal governance operations. The Presidential Accountability Committee (PAC) — five Full Members elected by the General Assembly, independent of the Board — provides an additional accountability layer operating in parallel to the Board's oversight function.

B.2 Presidential Term Design — Logic, Strengths, and Tensions

B.2.1 Why a 7-Year Term

The 7-year Presidential term is the most distinctive governance feature of this Constitution. The design logic is grounded in the realities of critical mineral market development:

Design Rationale	Constitutional Response
International ESG relationships and supply chain certifications take 3–5 years to build and require continuity of leadership to maintain trust with	7-year term provides sufficient tenure for the President to see multi-year market positioning through to fruition without mid-term disruption

Design Rationale	Constitutional Response
offtake partners, certification bodies, and development finance institutions	
The TASCMA Responsible Sourcing Mark, ICGLR compliance framework, and collective buyer agreements are institutional investments that take years to generate member value — political cycling destroys institutional memory	Two-term maximum (14 years lifetime) balances continuity with democratic rotation
Artisanal mining cooperatives in Tanzania have historically suffered from governance instability — frequent leadership changes, disputed elections, and internal factionalism — that prevented institutional development	Long-term Presidential mandate, combined with the cross-zone endorsement requirement (4 of 6 zones, minimum 60 endorsements), forces Presidential candidates to build genuinely national coalitions rather than regional blocs
The Board's 3-year electoral cycle provides democratic accountability for regional and sectoral interests without disrupting the strategic trajectory of the Association	The President-Board coordination mechanism (Section 15E.3) manages the structural tension between these two cycles without subordinating either to the other

B.2.2 Presidential Accountability Mechanisms

Mechanism	Location in Constitution	Strength	Limitation
Presidential Accountability Committee (PAC)	Section 15E.2	5 elected Full Members independent of the Board; annual assessment report to General Assembly;	PAC is advisory only — it cannot itself remove the President; its findings are input to a political process, not a legal trigger

Mechanism	Location in Constitution	Strength	Limitation
		access to accounts and contracts; retaliation against PAC members is a Tier 4 offence	
Annual State of the Association Address	Section 15E.1	Public accountability to all 89 delegates; circulated in writing 14 days in advance; creates a documented record of stated commitments	Compliance is assessed politically, not legally; no enforcement mechanism if the Address is misleading or incomplete
Vote of No Confidence	Section 15E.4	Simple majority of delegates at General Assembly; three consecutive Votes automatically trigger the formal removal process	Non-binding on its own; a politically embattled President can survive multiple Votes if they remain short of three consecutive
Blind Trust for Mineral Interests	Section 16A.6	Requires all mineral buying, dealing, or brokering interests to be placed in an independent blind trust within 60 days of election	No mechanism for annual verification that the trust is being maintained; relies on self-reporting and the Head of Legal & Compliance
Formal Removal	Section 15F	Requires 3/4 of ALL Full Members — a deliberately very high threshold ensuring the	The logistical barrier to mobilizing 75% of all Full Members (which could be 1,500+ people across six zones) means that non-

Mechanism	Location in Constitution	Strength	Limitation
		Association cannot remove a President on a transient political majority	criminal misconduct is practically difficult to sanction through removal

B.2.3 Structural Tension: 7-Year Presidential Term vs 3-Year Board Cycle

The structural tension between the President's 7-year term and the Board's 3-year cycle is the most significant governance risk in the leadership architecture. Three scenarios generate real friction:

Scenario	Risk Description	Constitutional Mechanism Available
Mid-term Board election produces a Board with a significantly different political or strategic mandate from the incumbent President	Board may resist implementing the Presidential Strategic Vision; President may resist Board attempts to change course; strategic paralysis results	Section 15E.3: Board may propose material strategic direction change by 2/3 majority resolution; President responds within 30 days; persistent disagreement triggers Special General Assembly — but no binding tie-break mechanism is specified
President uses the casting vote at Executive Committee (Section 15G.4) to repeatedly override Board majority positions on operational matters	Accumulated Board frustration; risk of governance deadlock; Board members begin to disengage	No specific limit on use of casting vote; relies on President exercising it judiciously — a constitutional gap
Following a Vote of No Confidence, the President loses the practical confidence of the Board but retains office for years before formal removal is triggered	Operational paralysis; leadership vacuum in external representation; member confidence erodes	Three consecutive Votes of No Confidence trigger the formal removal process — the three-vote threshold is the buffer against reactive removals but may extend a leadership crisis

Recommendation: The Board should adopt, at its first meeting, an Executive Governance Protocol clarifying the specific circumstances in which the casting vote may be used, and establishing a structured annual dialogue between the President and the Board Chairperson (the Treasurer, who is the most senior Board-elected officer under Section 15G) as a routine tension-management mechanism — before situations escalate to the Special General Assembly level.

B.3 Board of Directors — Structure Assessment

Board Element	Composition	Design Assessment	Sustainability Implication
12 zonal seats (2 per zone)		Equal representation across all six zones prevents any single zone from dominating Board decisions; at 11.8% of the Board per zone, no regional bloc can pass resolutions alone	High: prevents the regional capture that has destabilized many cooperative boards in Tanzania; zones with smaller current membership (e.g., Central Zone — lithium still early-stage) are not marginalized
2 Women Representatives (national ballot)		Creates a guaranteed female voice at Board level independent of zonal elections, where women candidates may face structural barriers	Medium-High: formal inclusion is achieved, but the two seats are a minimum floor — the Association should track and report on the proportion of women in all governance roles annually
1 Youth Representative (under 35, national ballot)		Reflects the demographic reality that a significant proportion of artisanal miners are young men and women; intergenerational leadership development	Medium: the age cap at 35 means a youth representative who joins at 34 may serve only one 3-year term before aging out mid-term — the Constitution should provide that a Youth Representative who exceeds the age cap during their term completes the term
1 Technical Expert (appointed by Board)		Ensures mining/geological/metallurgical expertise is present at all Board	Medium: the appointment is by the Board itself, creating self-perpetuation risk — a competitive

Board Element	Composition	Design Assessment	Sustainability Implication
		decisions; critical for evaluating Environmental Management Plans, processing technology proposals, and GSMT partnership agreements	shortlisting process with published criteria should be adopted at the first Board meeting
1 Legal Advisor (appointed by Board, Advocate of the High Court)		Ensures in-room legal guidance at Board level; critical for contracts, regulatory compliance, TCDC filings, and disciplinary appeals	Medium: same self-perpetuation risk as the Technical Expert seat; same remedy recommended
Maximum 2 consecutive terms (3 years each = 6 years maximum)		Prevents entrenchment while providing enough continuity for institutional memory to develop	High: the 18-month rule for by-election/co-option terms (Section 21A.4) ensures short-serving co-opted members do not count a partial term against their term limit — this is a well-considered detail

B.3.1 Board Vacancy Procedure (Section 21A) — Assessment

The runner-up co-option mechanism is a significant governance improvement over the prior version, which was silent on mid-term vacancies. Three sustainability points merit attention:

- i. If a Board election was uncontested (only one candidate for a zone's two seats), there is no runner-up to co-opt. The Constitution should specify that in an uncontested election, the zone's Zonal Committee nominates a replacement candidate for Board approval, subject to full eligibility criteria.
- ii. The 18-month rule (Section 21A.4 — a term of less than 18 months does not count toward the two-term limit) is correct and well-designed. It prevents the perverse incentive of a Board member engineering their own resignation late in a term to reset their term count.
- iii. The by-election trigger (Section 21A.3) is appropriate when a zone is left with zero Board seats. The 60-day timeline is realistic for an Association with zonal infrastructure in place from Phase 2 onwards, but may be challenging in Phase 1 when only three zonal offices exist. The Board should have authority to extend the by-election timeline by up to 30 days in Phase 1 where logistical constraints apply.

B.4 The Secretariat and Executive Director — Design Assessment

B.4.1 Executive Director Accountability Chain

Section 51.4 states that the Executive Director 'is accountable to the Board and reports directly to the President.' This dual reporting line reflects the tension between governance accountability (to the Board) and operational management (to the President as active chair of the Executive Committee). In well-functioning organizations this works smoothly. In periods of President-Board tension it creates a structural problem: the ED cannot simultaneously comply with a Board instruction and a contrary Presidential direction. The following hierarchy should be understood as the operative principle:

Matter Type	Decision Authority	ED's Obligation
Financial commitments above TZS 5,000,000 (Tanzania Shillings Five Million Only)	Board approval required (Section 16B); joint ED + President signature	ED must not commit without Board approval, regardless of Presidential instruction
Staff appointments and management	ED has full authority within approved staffing plan and salary bands	ED manages staff; Board approves changes to staffing plan; President does not direct individual staff members
Strategic operational decisions	Executive Committee mandate between Board meetings	ED implements ExCo decisions; brings material matters to full Board
Day-to-day operational management	ED sole authority within approved budget	President may provide guidance but not operational directives that bypass the Board's governance function
ED performance appraisal	Board conducts annual appraisal (not President alone)	ED reports on performance to Board; President's assessment is one input, not the sole determinant

B.4.2 Executive Director Term and Succession

The 5-year renewable contract with a Ten (10) year consecutive maximum (Section 51.3) is well-designed. However, the Constitution is silent on ED succession planning. The following should be adopted by the Board as a Standing Resolution at its first meeting:

- iv. The Board shall conduct an ED performance appraisal in Year 4 of each 5-year contract (not Year 5, to allow adequate time for recruitment if renewal is not offered).

- v. From Year 7 onwards (in the event of a second term), the Head of Programs and the Head of Finance shall be developed as potential internal succession candidates through a formal leadership development programme.
- vi. In the event of sudden ED vacancy, the Head of Finance & Administration shall serve as Acting Executive Director for a maximum of 90 days while recruitment is conducted.

B.5 Committee Structure — Participation Sustainability

The Association operates seven Standing Committees, a Fund Management Committee, and six Zonal Committees — each with mandatory quarterly or bi-monthly meetings. The aggregate governance meeting commitment across all bodies is estimated as follows:

Body	Meetings per Year	Members Required	Total Participation-Days/Year
Board of Directors	6 (quarterly minimum + 2 special)	17	102
Executive Committee	12 (monthly minimum)	7	84
Presidential Accountability Committee (PAC)	4 (quarterly)	5	20
7 Standing Committees (combined)	28 (4 per committee per year)	35–63 across all	98–176
Fund Management Committee	6 (bi-monthly minimum)	7 (voting)	42
6 Zonal Committees	12 (2 per zone per year minimum)	30 (5 per zone)	60
6 Zonal General Assemblies	6 (1 per zone per year)	All Full Members in zone	Variable
1 National General Assembly	1	89 delegates	89
TOTAL ESTIMATE	75+ formal governance meetings per year	—	495–573 participation-days

For Full Members who are active artisanal miners running operations across potentially remote sites, a commitment of 8–12 governance meeting days per year per active committee member is substantial. Three risks follow:

- vii. **QUORUM FAILURE RISK:** Committees with difficult-to-mobilize members may repeatedly struggle to achieve the 50%-plus-one quorum threshold, particularly in Phase 1 before zonal infrastructure and communication systems are established. Virtual meeting capability (Section 19) partially mitigates this but requires reliable mobile/internet connectivity in mining areas — which is not guaranteed in Katavi, Kagera, or parts of Ruvuma.
- viii. **COMMITTEE CAPTURE RISK:** If some members are unable to attend regularly due to operational demands, the small pool of consistently attending members may begin to dominate committee decisions, undermining the representative purpose of the committee structure. A maximum overlap rule — no Full Member to serve on more than two Standing Committees simultaneously — should be adopted.
- ix. **VOLUNTEER FATIGUE RISK:** Committee positions are unpaid (members serve in their personal capacity as Full Members). Over a 3-year term, the volunteer burden may cause capable members to decline reappointment, reducing the talent pool available for committee leadership.

Sustainability Recommendation: The Board should, in Year 2, commission a Governance Participation Review examining actual attendance rates, quorum achievement, and member satisfaction across all governance bodies. If average attendance falls below 60%, the Board should consider consolidating the seven Standing Committees into five (merging Marketing & Supply Chain with Technical; and Gender, Youth & Social Inclusion with Membership) and reducing mandatory meeting frequency to three times per year for lower-risk committees.

B.6 Leadership Structure Sustainability Scorecard

The following scorecard rates twelve governance sustainability dimensions against a 10-point scale. Scores reflect the design quality of this Constitution as adopted, before operational performance data is available.

Governance Dimension	Score /10	Rating	Key Strength / Key Risk
Board structure and diversity	8.0	Strong	2 per zone; women + youth + technical + legal seats; no single bloc dominance

Governance Dimension		Score /10	Rating	Key Strength / Key Risk
Presidential framework	accountability	6.0	Adequate	PAC is well-designed; removal threshold (3/4 all Full Members) is practically very high for non-criminal misconduct
President–Board management	tension	6.0	Adequate	Coordination clause exists (Section 15E.3); no binding tie-break mechanism; relies on political goodwill
Conflict of interest controls		8.0	Strong	Annual declaration; recusal obligation; Contracts Register; Blind Trust for President; Tier 3 sanction for non-compliance
Succession planning — President		7.0	Good	VP succession is clear and immediate; by-election trigger well defined; 60-day window achievable
Succession planning — Executive Director		5.0	Moderate risk	Acting ED provision absent from Constitution; no internal succession development framework specified
Board vacancy procedure		7.0	Good	Runner-up co-option; by-election if zone left with zero seats; 18-month rule prevents term-count gaming
Appointed seat governance (Technical + Legal)		5.0	Moderate risk	Board self-appoints; no competitive shortlisting requirement; self-perpetuation risk over time
Committee sustainability		5.0	Moderate risk	75+ governance meetings/year is heavy for active miners; no overlap limit; volunteer fatigue risk in Year 3+
Zonal representation and voice		8.0	Strong	Zonal Assemblies; Zonal Committees; 2 Board seats per zone; delegate quota in General Assembly

Governance Dimension	Score /10	Rating	Key Strength / Key Risk
Executive Director accountability clarity	6.0	Adequate	Dual reporting (Board + President) creates ambiguity; no formal ED performance appraisal process specified
Overall governance integrity	7.5	Good	Conflict of interest, procurement, disciplinary, and election petition frameworks are all detailed and workable

COMPOSITE SCORE: 6.7 / 10 — Structurally Sound; Execution Risks Identified

The leadership architecture is the strongest governance element of this Constitution. The principal risk is not structural design but operational execution: whether the elected leadership will use the coordination mechanisms with the discipline the Constitution assumes, and whether the professional Secretariat will be adequately resourced to support the volume of governance activity this structure requires.

B.7 Priority Governance Recommendations for the First Board

The following actions should be adopted by the Board as Standing Resolutions at its first meeting after the General Assembly:

Priority	Recommendation	Constitutional Basis	Timeline
1 — Critical	Adopt an Executive Governance Protocol defining the circumstances for use of the Presidential casting vote; establishing a structured annual President–Board Chairperson dialogue; and confirming the ED's sole reporting line for operational matters	Sections 15G.4, 51.4	First Board meeting

Priority	Recommendation	Constitutional Basis	Timeline
2 — Critical	Adopt a competitive shortlisting process (published criteria, minimum three candidates, evaluation panel including one PAC member) for the Technical Expert and Legal Advisor Board appointments	Section 16.1 (Technical, Legal Advisor seats)	First Board meeting
3 — High	Specify a licensed third-party digital voting platform as the Association's default electronic ballot system for General Assembly votes and Presidential elections, to be ratified at the first General Assembly	Sections 15D.2, 15F.2	First General Assembly
4 — High	Adopt a committee overlap rule: no Full Member may serve simultaneously on more than two Standing Committees; the Board will review if this rule needs modification after Year 1 participation data is available	Section 17 (Standing Committees)	First Board meeting
5 — High	Designate the Head of Finance & Administration as Acting Executive Director in the event of ED vacancy, and adopt a Year 4 performance appraisal schedule for the ED	Section 51	First Board meeting
6 — Medium	Adopt a Youth Representative age-overage rule: a Youth Representative who exceeds 35 years of age during their elected term shall complete that term; the age limit applies only at the point of nomination	Section 16.1 (Youth Representative seat)	First Board meeting
7 — Medium	Commission a Governance Participation Review in Year 2, examining attendance rates and quorum achievement; authorize the	Section 17 (Standing Committees)	Year 2 Board agenda

Priority	Recommendation	Constitutional Basis	Timeline
	Board to consolidate committees if average attendance falls below 60%		

END OF APPENDIX B

Leadership Structure — Governance Analysis and Sustainability Assessment

This Appendix forms part of the TASCMA Founding Constitution, By-Laws and Governance Framework, Version 3.0 Clean Final.